Written by Michael Rothberg, Unit for Criticism and Interpretive Theory
It’s not clear to me that there is a consensus definition of the humanities, especially among non-humanist colleagues, administrators, and citizens, but even among some humanities scholars themselves! According to the Oxford American Dictionary, the humanities are: “learning or literature concerned with human culture, esp. literature, history, art, music, and philosophy.” In our context, it is probably worth adding that the “learning or literature” we’re concerned with is comprised of academic disciplines that study human culture.
Does this question of definition matter? I believe it does. Together with many of you who responded to the discussion of the “crisis of the humanities,” I think that the humanities disciplines will be stronger when they work closely with non-humanities disciplines and remain open to the blurring of the bounds of knowledge that has been central to interdisciplinary cultural scholarship for decades. But I also think we cannot afford to sacrifice the specificity of our forms of knowledge—both for reasons of disciplinary self-interest and, more important, because those forms are essential to the future of our planet. This post arises from my sense (and I could cite evidence) that a fuzziness about the precise contours of the humanities (even if those contours are themselves fuzzy) characterizes a lot of important decision making about the future of the humanities both here at Illinois and, most likely, in other places, too. There may be opportunities to exploit in such fuzziness, but there are also significant dangers.
With that context in mind, here’s my own attempt to formulate a definition:
I do not presuppose that all humanities disciplines and all humanities scholarship will make equal use of these four characteristics or will makes use of them equally in every work of scholarship. Nor do I presuppose that non-humanities disciplines do not make use of some or all of these characteristics. But I do think that a family resemblance characterizes the humanities and meaningfully distinguishes them from the non-humanities along the lines of the definition offered above.
Does this definition (and set of sub-definitions) describe the humanities for you? If not, what changes would you propose? Please keep in mind that an effective definition will have to be concise, even if its terms are open to further elaboration (as I’ve tried to demonstrate here). Perhaps most important, how can we use such a definition to return to our earlier question: how to defend the humanities at a moment when knowledge is increasingly being corporatized and instrumentalized? I think we can (and need to) use such a definition of the humanities and the value of the humanities in discussions with university administrators and others.
It’s not clear to me that there is a consensus definition of the humanities, especially among non-humanist colleagues, administrators, and citizens, but even among some humanities scholars themselves! According to the Oxford American Dictionary, the humanities are: “learning or literature concerned with human culture, esp. literature, history, art, music, and philosophy.” In our context, it is probably worth adding that the “learning or literature” we’re concerned with is comprised of academic disciplines that study human culture.
Does this question of definition matter? I believe it does. Together with many of you who responded to the discussion of the “crisis of the humanities,” I think that the humanities disciplines will be stronger when they work closely with non-humanities disciplines and remain open to the blurring of the bounds of knowledge that has been central to interdisciplinary cultural scholarship for decades. But I also think we cannot afford to sacrifice the specificity of our forms of knowledge—both for reasons of disciplinary self-interest and, more important, because those forms are essential to the future of our planet. This post arises from my sense (and I could cite evidence) that a fuzziness about the precise contours of the humanities (even if those contours are themselves fuzzy) characterizes a lot of important decision making about the future of the humanities both here at Illinois and, most likely, in other places, too. There may be opportunities to exploit in such fuzziness, but there are also significant dangers.
With that context in mind, here’s my own attempt to formulate a definition:
The humanities are academic disciplines that employ critical, historical, interpretive, and speculative methods to study the meanings, values, and effects of human endeavors.
*By critical, I mean the close analysis of texts, concepts, contexts, and events as well as the self-reflexive scrutiny of the investigator’s own methods of analysis.
*By historical, I mean an understanding of meanings, values, and effects as situated in complex—but at least partially understandable—contexts and as varying and changing according to time and place.
*By interpretive, I mean that meanings, values, and effects are not self-evident, fixed, or inherent in texts, events, or contexts, but rather must be disclosed in discrete acts of critical analysis that will produce varied results (i.e. diverse interpretations).
*By speculative, I mean that the meanings, values, and effects that humanities scholars study are non-obvious and not always empirically verifiable, although they sometimes are and although questions of evidence remain crucial.
I do not presuppose that all humanities disciplines and all humanities scholarship will make equal use of these four characteristics or will makes use of them equally in every work of scholarship. Nor do I presuppose that non-humanities disciplines do not make use of some or all of these characteristics. But I do think that a family resemblance characterizes the humanities and meaningfully distinguishes them from the non-humanities along the lines of the definition offered above.
Does this definition (and set of sub-definitions) describe the humanities for you? If not, what changes would you propose? Please keep in mind that an effective definition will have to be concise, even if its terms are open to further elaboration (as I’ve tried to demonstrate here). Perhaps most important, how can we use such a definition to return to our earlier question: how to defend the humanities at a moment when knowledge is increasingly being corporatized and instrumentalized? I think we can (and need to) use such a definition of the humanities and the value of the humanities in discussions with university administrators and others.